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Grenberg has accomplished the seemingly impossible. She has written an
entire book on Kant’s take on our pre-theoretical conception of morality, and
the ordinary agent, without discussing Rousseau, or Kant’s Rousseauian turn.1
One might regard this as a weakness of Grenberg’s book. I, however, think it is
a merit, since much has been written specifically on Kant and Rousseau
already. Grenberg focuses exclusively on a detailed reconstruction of Kant’s
position and arguments in the Groundwork and the second Critique. Kant’s
Defense of Common Moral Experience is a focused, analytic, original and
illuminating study of the role of ordinary moral experience for Kant’s practical
philosophy.
In part 1, Grenberg introduces the special phenomenological method
that she attributes to Kant: ‘to engage in practical philosophy, Kantian
style y we must set aside third person, theoretical concerns and enter
first into phenomenological reflection upon the common, first-personal
experience of ourselves as agents’ (15). First-personal, felt experiences are
not idiosyncratic but express ‘universally shared aspects of our agential
experience’ (21). Both the common agent as well as the philosopher should
pay attention to their phenomenological experience, and become better at
understanding how the moral law forces itself upon us. Becoming moral
and becoming a moral philosopher begin with the same attentiveness to this
experience of obligation.
We cannot know the cause of our phenomenological experiences. Yet
these experiences can be ‘hints of something intelligible’ (196), and the
cause of these experiences can be an object of wonder and mystery for us.
Attentive reflection on phenomenological felt experiences makes ‘more and
more clear to oneself y the exact nature of that experience’ (55). Feeling
is not the grounding of moral obligation, but the epistemic tool that gives
us epistemic access to the thing ‘that will provide evidence or proof
of practical cognitions’ (59), namely to our rational nature. The feeling
VOLUME 19 – 2 KANTIAN REVIEW | 315
http://journals.cambridge.orgDownloaded: 05 Sep 2014 IP address: 138.251.162.242
Grenberg is describing is of course respect: a sensible, a priori feeling of
being categorically obligated.
In part 2, Grenberg turns to a detailed investigation of the role of first-
personal phenomenological experience in the Groundwork. According to
Grenberg, the Groundwork distinguishes between a pre-corrupted and a
corrupted state of agency. In the pre-corrupted state the common agent can
appreciate categorical obligation, and a Socratic guide can help and encourage
her to be more attentive to her moral experience, but does not have to provide
any new or philosophical ideas. Kant’s treatment of the natural dialectic
at 4: 405 describes the common agent’s exit from her state of innocence.
From Groundwork II onwards Kant rejects a phenomenological experience
of categorical obligation, since the possibility of self-deception discredits
our seeming experience of moral or categorical obligation. The cure for the
corrupted common agent is not a ‘more intensive appeal to the common
person herself’ (94), but comes from the academic philosopher, and is ‘asking
us to exit the common point of view’ (90).
Due to his rejection of the possibility of a reliable experience of categorical
obligation, Kant’s Groundwork III deduction draws on the phenomenological
experience of negative freedom, or of being ‘simply unconstrained’ (114).
According to Grenberg, attentive reflection upon the experience of negative
freedom cannot vindicate our status as moral agents without the additional,
theoretical premise that ‘in the world of sensibility, everything is caused by
something else’ (128). Groundwork III is a phenomenological failure because
Kant is not willing to simply accept an experience of categorical obligation as
the starting point for his deduction.
It should be noted that Grenberg’s criticism of Kant’s Groundwork III
deduction can either be understood as revealing a weakness in Kant, or
alternatively point to limits of Grenberg’s own phenomenological inter-
pretation. Grenberg assumes that being morally obligated can only be
vindicated in a purely phenomenological manner, and she turns this against
Kant’s argument, instead of against her phenomenological interpretation.
I do not see why the Groundwork deduction as one of the most complex
philosophical operations in Kant’s work cannot combine different approa-
ches, phenomenology as well as theoretical or metaphysical enquiry into
the structure of appearances and rationality. Grenberg largely ignores the
opportunity to constructively enrich her account of Kant’s methodology with
elements from the theoretical sphere such as propositions about the causal
determinism of appearances grounded in the first Critique.
In part 3, Grenberg turns to the supposedly more phenomenological
second Critique, and especially to the fact of reason. Kant, according to
Grenberg, ‘turns himself around 180 degrees’ (160) in the second Critique,
and relies on phenomenological experience of obligation, instead of on
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experience of negative freedom. In the second Critique, Kant is optimistic
that the method of attentiveness to one’s experience can reveal unconditional
obligation even to the corrupted agent. The Second Gallows Case (5: 30) is
the prime example of a phenomenological experience of a ‘constraint of
inclinations by this special feeling of respect’ (166).2 Attentiveness to this
experience lets philosophers recognize the two central claims inherent in
the fact of reason, namely that: (i) rational human agents are categorically
obligated by the moral law, and (ii) they are capable of acting as the moral
law demands – (i) leads to the formulations of the categorical imperative,
(ii) is the basis for the deduction of freedom.
In her last chapter, Grenberg discusses how to respond to people who
claim to lack a phenomenological experience of obligation. According to
Grenberg, respect is an objective, synthetic a priori practical cognition,
or an ‘intersubjectively valid experience’ (278), since all rational human
beings share it. Grenberg’s argument here amounts to the orthodox Kantian
position that respect is a special, rational and necessary feeling. She does
not establish, nor does she intend to establish, the objectivity of moral
cognition for someone who does not already buy into Kantian premises.
According to Grenberg, an agent who ‘stubbornly asserts’ that she lacks the
relevant experience should be told ‘to pay more attention!’ (281).
Grenberg’s reading of Kant is innovative and thought-provoking in a
number of ways, three of which I would like to point out and briefly
discuss. (i) Grenberg stresses that phenomenological or felt experience is
epistemically potent and crucial for Kant’s practical philosophy. However,
some of the major passages pertaining to the role of feeling in Kant suggest,
I think, that the Groundwork might not be a phenomenological failure, but
simply not a work that hinges on phenomenology in Grenberg’s sense.
Instead, in the Groundwork, especially Groundwork I, Kant is interested in
how agents without philosophical education judge about certain concrete
cases of moral relevance, what criteria are exhibited in these judgements,
how these criteria figure in ordinary reasoning and what principles or
metaphysical positions these agents implicitly commit themselves to in their
reasoning. This stress on judgement and ordinary reasoning, as opposed to
feeling, can also be found in later works.3
(ii) According to Grenberg, we do not have an awareness of moral
obligation prior to the feeling of respect.4 The feeling of respect coincides
with our consciousness of being under moral obligation. Respect informs us
that we are obligated, what we are obligated to do, and it can motivate us
to act (140–8). This conception of the fact of reason and respect presents
the pre-theoretical agent as passive and receptive. Grenberg regards it as one
of the advantages of the second Critique over the Groundwork that in the
second Critique Kant solely relies on a passive feeling of moral obligation.
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This conception ignores that the Groundwork and second Critique both
emphasize common agents’ active engagement with moral subject-matters.
Kant is aware that an autonomous agent is not simply provided with moral
knowledge by a feeling, but has the ability to determine on her own what
ought to be done by actively reflecting about moral situations (see the
passages in n. 3, below). What room does Grenberg’s account leave for
the crucial moment of actively reasoning about what ought to be done in
the light of rational criteria such as universality and dignity? Respect does
too much work on Grenberg’s interpretation and threatens to eclipse a very
common part of our moral experience: the experience of reasoning,
reflecting, weighing reasons and finally arriving at a conclusion regarding
what to do.
(iii) Grenberg’s account emphasizes the self-sufficiency of the rational
agent, and she only spends half a page discussing the role of education for
Kant (282). It would be interesting to see if Grenberg’s account can be
expanded to give as much weight to moral education, and the role of a
moral community as Kant seems to give it in his Doctrines of Method in the
second Critique and Metaphysics of Morals.
According to Grenberg, it is the ‘tragedy of Kant scholarship in the past
200 years’ to have lost sight of Kant’s ‘first intention of his project – the
defence of a common approach to ethics’ (1). Grenberg’s book is part of a
growing trend of approaching Kant from his commitment to our ordinary
reasoning, or ordinary understanding and experience of morality. Grenberg’s
views are, even when outside of the mainstream, forcefully argued with great
knowledge and understanding of Kant’s practical (and theoretical) philo-
sophy, and brought forward with the intention of presenting a systematically
attractive interpretation that challenges the received understanding of Kant
as well as of how to approach moral philosophy.
Martin Sticker
University of St Andrews and Stirling University
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Notes
1 Grenberg only mentions Rousseau in a footnote (87).
2 Grenberg contrasts the Second Gallows Case with the most hardened scoundrel in
Groundwork, 4: 454–5 (see especially ch.7). From these two cases ‘very different
conclusions’ (178) can be drawn.
3 See for instance 4: 403, 4: 421–3, 5: 27, 5: 36, 5: 44, 5: 69.
4 This claim also does not sit well with certain passages in the second Critique in which
Kant states that respect for the moral law has no epistemic function (5: 76. 16–23).
Overall, textual evidence in the second Critique for the epistemic function of respect is,
admittedly, ambiguous.
book reviews
318 | KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 19 – 2
